We study the impact of di¤erent regulatory regimes on generic competition and pharmaceutical pricing using a unique policy experiment in Norway, where reference pricing (RP) replaced price cap regulation in 2003 for a sub-sample of o¤-patent products. First, we construct a vertical di¤erentiation model to analyze the impact on prices and market shares of the two regimes. Then, we exploit a detailed panel dataset at product level covering several o¤-patent molecules before and after the policy reform. O¤-patent drugs not subject to reference pricing serve as our control group. We …nd that RP signi…cantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices.
Introduction
competition in the pharmaceutical market. 5;6 Danzon and Chao (2000) argue, however, that regulation drives out competition and is thus counter-productive in obtaining costsavings. 7 In the present study, we argue that it depends on how you regulate.
In this paper, we study the impact of two widely used regulatory regimes -price cap regulation and reference pricing (RP) -on competition and prices in the pharmaceutical o¤-patent market. Under price cap regulation the regulator curbs market power by enforcing maximum prices that …rms are allowed to charge. Reference pricing, on the other hand, de…nes instead a maximum reimbursement that will be covered by the regulator.
If consumers demand a product with a price above the reference price, they will have to cover this extra cost out-of-pocket. Our study consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. The theoretical analysis is based on a vertical di¤erentiation model, where we analyze price competition between brand-names and generics under the di¤erent regimes and derive empirically testable predictions. The empirical part of the paper exploits a unique policy experiment in Norway, where the government exposed a subsample of the o¤-patent drugs on the market to RP. The policy reform is thus a natural experiment that provides us with a comparison group consisting of o¤-patent drugs subject to price cap regulation throughout the whole period. We use a rich product level panel dataset covering a four-year period from 2001 to 2005 that gives us variation over time (before and after the reform) and across products that are subject to di¤erent regulatory regimes (price cap regulation or RP).
Our paper provides three main …ndings. First, we …nd that RP leads to signi…cant price reductions on both brand-names (33 percent) and generics (22 percent) . This …nding runs counter to the price convergency prediction by Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon 5 Danzon (1997) provides an excellent overview of theory and practice of price regulation in the pharmaceutical industry. See also Kanavos (2001) for a comprehensive overview of pharmaceutical regulation practices in 14 EU countries. 6 Even in the US there are some price control mechanisms. For example, (generic) reference pricing is well-established through the "maximum allowable charge" programs used by Medicaid. The recent extension of Medicare to prescription drugs has spurred a debate of price controls also in the US (see e.g., Frank and Newhouse, 2008) 7 They base their conclusion on a cross-national study using data for 1992, showing that price competition between generic competitors is stronger in unregulated or less regulated markets (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany) than in countries with strict price or reimbursement regulations (France, Italy, and Japan).
and Ketcham (2004) who argue that while brand-names are likely to reduce their prices, generics will respond to RP by increasing their prices since demand becomes relatively less price elastic below the RP. In the theory section we show that their argument is correct if the RP is (perceived to be) exogenous to the …rms'pricing decisions. However, under an endogenous RP system the generic producers have a strategic incentive to lower their prices to reduce the RP and thus make the brand-name more expensive for the consumers.
Our …rst …nding is in line with previous empirical studies. Pavcnik (2002) studies the introduction of (therapeutic) RP in Germany in 1989. Using data for two di¤erent therapeutic …elds (oral antidiabetics and antiulcerants) for 1986 to 1996, she identi…es signi…cant price reductions of the RP system on both brand-names and generics, with the e¤ect being stronger for brand-names. Brekke, Grasdal and Holmås (2009) exploit the same policy experiment as the present paper, but use a dataset with on-patent products and substantially fewer o¤-patent molecules. They also …nd that RP triggers strong price reductions on generics and even stronger price reductions on brand-names. 8;9 In Norway the RP was set as a weighted average of brand-name and generic prices and updated every third month. In fact, most countries use a RP rule that depends on …rms'pricing. 10 Thus, the robust empirical …nding that RP reduces both brand-name and generic prices can be explained by our theoretical model of an endogenous RP system. Secondly, we …nd that RP stimulates generic competition by signi…cantly reducing the brand-names'market share (almost 15 percent). The introduction of RP makes the brandname more expensive for consumers for given prices, which suggests a shift in demand towards generics. However, as shown above, the brand-name …rms respond to RP by substantially lowering their prices, which pull in the other direction. In the theory model we show that the direct demand e¤ect of RP always dominates the indirect price e¤ect, resulting in higher generic market shares. 8 Brekke, Grasdal and Holmås (2009) also reports cross-price e¤ects on non-referenced (potentially onpatent) therapeutic substitutes, suggesting potential negative spillovers on innovation incentives. 9 Bergman and Rudholm (2003) study the e¤ects of the Swedish RP system on brand-name (not generic) prices. Distinguishing between actual and potential generic competition, they …nd that RP only reduced prices of brand-names that faced actual generic competition.
1 0 See, for instance, the survey by Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000).
In the empirical part we separate the two counteracting e¤ects by controlling for relative branded-generic prices. We …nd, however, no signi…cant impact of changes in relative prices on the brand-name market shares. Thus, the reduction of almost 15 percent in brand-name market shares is a direct demand response to the radical change in copayments brought about by the introduction of RP, which by far outweighs any indirect e¤ects via the price responses.
This part of our analysis is closely related to Aronsson et al. (2001) who use Swedish data to analyze the impact of relative branded-generic prices and the introduction of RP on brand-name market shares. 11 The e¤ects of both relative prices and RP are weak and often insigni…cant. Estimating the impact of RP on the whole sample (12 molecules) provides no signi…cant e¤ects on brand-name market shares. They therefore run regressions at molecule level, where they report signi…cant, though weak, e¤ects for 5 out of 12 molecules.
While the weak e¤ect of relative prices is in line with our results, this is not the case for RP.
However, our study di¤ers from theirs in important ways. Most importantly, in Sweden the reform was introduced for all o¤-patent substances, while we have natural experiment, which improves the scope for identi…cation. Second, we have a more detailed and extensive dataset, covering 24 molecules with monthly price and volume data.
Our third main …nding is that RP reduces average molecule prices by almost 30 percent. This is a substantial reduction, especially taking into account that Norway has a relatively strict PC regime. Since overall demand for pharmaceuticals is quite price inelastic (see, e.g., Newhouse, 1993) , average molecule prices are presumably good proxies for cost savings (Danzon and Chao, 2000) . As shown above, there are two di¤erent e¤ects that contribute to these cost-savings: (i) reductions in both brand-name and generic drug prices, and
(ii) a shift in demand from brand-names to generics. Thus, our results suggest that RP is more e¢ cient than PC regulation in stimulating competition and reducing prices and expenditures in the pharmaceutical o¤-patent market segment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop a theoretical model and derive predictions for the empirical analysis. In Section 3 we present some institutional background by describing the price cap regulation and the policy experiment with reference pricing in Norway. In Section 4 we present our data and some descriptive statistics. In
Section 5 we present the empirical method and our basic results with respect to brandname and generic prices, brand-name market shares, and average prices at molecule level.
In Section 6 we perform various robustness checks, where we test the validity of our control group and account for serial correlation and endogeneity. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
A theoretical model
Consider a therapeutic market with products o¤ered by two …rms. Firm B o¤ers the original (o¤-patent) brand-name drug b, while …rm G o¤ers a generic substitute g. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to the gross valuation of drug treatment, represented by a parameter which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; t]. It would be natural to think of the heterogeneity of gross valuations as re ‡ecting di¤erences in severity levels, but it could also be interpreted as di¤erences in prescription practices among physicians. 12 The total mass of consumers is normalized to 1. Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the most preferred drug. The utility derived from no drug consumption is zero, while a consumer who buys one unit of drug i obtains a net utility
where > 1 is the (perceived) quality di¤erence -e.g., due to di¤erences in advertising intensity -between the brand-name and the generic drug, and c i is the patient copayment for drug i. 13;14 A consumer with a positive net utility of drug consumption will choose the most preferred drug version by trading o¤ drug quality against drug copayment. The higher the gross valuation of drug treatment, the more the consumer is willing to pay in order to purchase the (high-quality) brand-name drug. A consumer who is indi¤erent between the two drug versions has a gross valuation equal to b , given by b c b = b c g ; yielding
Consumers with a gross valuation higher than b demand the brand-name drug, while the remaining consumers demand the generic drug, as long as the net utility of drug consumption is non-negative. Total demand for the two drug versions are thus given by
From these demand functions we can de…ne the market share of the generic drug,
Assuming that marginal production costs of both drug versions are constant and equal to w, pro…ts are given by 1 3 As mentioned in the Introduction, there is strong empirical evidence that generic drugs are not perceived to be perfect substitutes to the original brand-name drug, despite being chemically identical. The …ndings of substantial and persistent branded-generic price di¤erences after generic entry (see, e.g., Grabowski and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Scott Morton, 2000) …t well with predictions of vertical di¤erentiation models. Two recent papers applying this approach to branded-generic competition are Königbauer (2007) and Brekke et al. (2007) . 1 4 Alternatively, we could interpret the parameters and as simply re ‡ecting some (unexplained) preferences for brand-name versus generic drugs. We could also let these preferences be idiosyncratic by assuming that only a fraction consumers prefer the brand-name drug, i.e., that > 1 for some consumers while = 1 for others. However, this would just create extra demand for the generic drug without qualitatively a¤ecting the nature of competition between brand-name and generic drugs. Thus, for simplicity, and without much loss of generality, we let > 1 for all consumers.
where p i is the price of drug i; i = b; g. Given the restrictions imposed by the regulatory regime in place, we assume that the two …rms play a Bertrand game, simultaneously choosing drug prices to maximize pro…ts.
No regulation
As a benchmark for comparison, consider the case of no regulation, where …rms are free to choose drug prices and patient copayment is given by
where f > 0 is a …xed fee and 2 (0; 1) is the coinsurance rate. 15 To make sure that both …rms are active in equilibrium, we impose the condition f + w < t 2 . The …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximizing drug prices yield the following bestresponse functions for the producers of the brand-name and generic drug, respectively:
The best-response functions con…rm that drug prices are strategic complements; a higher brand-name drug price induces a higher generic drug price, and vice versa.
Under free pricing, equilibrium drug prices are found by simultaneously solving (8)- (9),
1 5 A copayment system with a …xed and a variable component is common for many countries (see, e.g., Kanavos, 2001 ). Notice, however, that the parameters and f can be given several alternative interpretations. For example, could be interpreted as the prescribing physician's price consciousness (see, e.g., Hellerstein, 1998) , while f can be interpreted also as the (non-monetary) cost of attending a GP to obtain a prescription.
Since the brand-name drug is perceived to be of higher quality than the generic drug, …rm B will set the higher price, p b > p g , and serve the consumers with higher gross valuation of drug treatment. The larger the degree of perceived vertical di¤erentiation, , the larger the branded-generic price di¤erence in equilibrium.
Price cap regulation
The equilibrium outcome under price cap regulation is a straightforward modi…cation of the free pricing equilibrium derived above. If the producer of the brand-name drug faces a binding price cap, p b , set by a regulator, the equilibrium generic drug price is given by (9) , with p b = p b . Stricter price regulation makes the brand-name drug less expensive for consumers, inducing -all else equal -a shift in demand towards drug b. However, since prices are strategic complements, …rm G will respond by lowering the price of the generic drug. An assessment of the total e¤ect shows that the former (direct) e¤ect dominates the latter (indirect) e¤ect:
Proposition 1 Under price cap regulation, a reduction in the (binding) price cap reduces the equilibrium market share of generics.
In other words, stricter price cap regulation dampens generic competition. If price cap regulation is su¢ ciently strict, generic competition will be completely eliminated.
The critical price cap, below which the generic producer will exit the market, is given by
We see that the likelihood of price cap regulation driving out generic competition is increasing in the degree of perceived vertical di¤erentiation and the …xed cost of drug consumption, while decreasing in the degree of coinsurance.
Reference pricing
Under a reference pricing (RP) system, …rms are free to set drug prices, but patient copayment is based on a reference price, r, that is set by a regulator. 16 More speci…cally, if a consumer chooses a drug that is priced higher than the reference price, she has to pay the full di¤erence between the reference price and the actual drug price. Usually, the reference price is set at a level somewhere between the lowest and highest drug price in the market. For a reference price r 2 (p g ; p b ), the copayment schedule is given by
In order to illustrate the decomposed e¤ects of RP on drug pricing and generic competition,
we will do the analysis in two steps: First, we consider the case where r is exogenous to the …rms's pricing decisions, which we dub Exogenous RP. Subsequently, we endogenize r and make it a function of the prices set by the …rms in the market. This scenario is dubbed Endogenous RP.
Exogenous RP
Assume that the …rms perceive the reference price to be exogenously given. For r 2 (p g ; p b ), equilibrium prices are then given by
We can analyze the e¤ects of RP by considering a marginal reduction in r. RP implies that the brand-name drug becomes relatively more expensive, and that drug demand becomes more elastic for prices above r. The resulting price responses are easily derived from (14)- (15) This result is in line with the price convergence hypothesis: The introduction of ref-
erence pricing leads to a price convergence towards the reference price; the generic drug becomes more expensive, while the brand-name drug becomes cheaper. 17 However, this hypothesis ignores the fact that, in most reference pricing systems, the reference price is determined as a function of actual drug prices and is thus endogenous. If the reference price is frequently updated, the drug producers know that their price setting is going to a¤ect the reference price, and thereby demand and pro…ts, in the future.
Endogenous RP
Assume that the reference price is a weighted average of the brand-name and generic drug prices:
When the …rms are able to in ‡uence the reference price through their price setting, a new and counteracting incentive for the generic producer is introduced. As before, reference pricing makes the brand-name drug more expensive, giving the generic producer an incentive to raise prices. However, the generic producer can make the brand-name drug even more expensive by lowering the price of the generic drug, since this automatically reduces the reference price. Equilibrium prices are now given by
We can analyze the e¤ects of reference pricing by considering a marginal increase in . The equilibrium price responses of RP are given by
where
Thus, endogenizing the reference price completely reverts the price response of the generic producer, implying that RP leads to price reductions for brand-name and generic drugs.
Since both drugs become cheaper, the e¤ect of RP on relative prices is a priori uncertain.
Equilibrium relative prices, de…ned as ! rp := p rp b =p rp g , are given by
It is straightforward to verify that, in our parameterized model,
the price reduction is stronger, in absolute terms, for the brand-name drug.
What is the e¤ect of RP on generic competition, measured by the generic market share? The above analysis suggests that there are two counteracting forces:
(i) For given relative drug prices, RP generally leads to an increase in the relative copayment rate, which is given by
The e¤ect of RP is then given by
The strength of this e¤ect is decreasing in both f and . Indeed, in the absence of insurance, i.e., ! 1, there is obviously no e¤ect of RP on relative copayments. Generally, though, as long as < 1, RP induces a shift in consumption -for given drug pricesfrom brand-name to generic drugs.
(ii) The positive relationship between RP and relative copayments might be, at least partly, compensated for by a reduction in relative drug prices, i.e.,
above. All else equal, this e¤ects leads to a shift of consumption from generic to brandname drugs. The overall e¤ect on market shares is thus a priori ambiguous.
Combining the two above mentioned e¤ects, the overall impact of RP on generic competition is
Thus, the increase in the relative copayment rate is not outweighed by the drop in relative drug prices, implying that RP leads to an increase in the generic market share. It is also possible to con…rm that the positive e¤ect of RP on generic market shares is weaker the higher the degree of coinsurance, i.e., @ 2 rp g =@ @ < 0. This is quite intuitive, since reference pricing has a smaller impact on relative copayments for higher levels of . In the extreme case of = 1, where patients pay the full drug price out-of-pocket, a reference pricing system is de facto irrelevant.
Proposition 3 Assume that the reference price is endogenously determined as a function of the drug prices in the market. A higher weight attached to the low-priced generic drug, implying all else equal a reduction in the reference price, will then lead to (i) a reduction in both brand-name and generic drug prices and (ii) an increase in the market share of generic drugs.
Discussion and theoretical predictions
In our theoretical analysis, we have made the important distinction between exogenous and endogenous RP. In the Norwegian experiment, the reference price was de…ned as a sales-weighted average of the drug prices within each therapeutical class and updated every 3 months. This suggests that endogenous RP -which predicts lower prices for both brand-names and generics in response to RP -is the most appropriate choice of model.
Furthermore, notice that endogenizing the weights ( in our model) by market shares only reinforces our previously derived e¤ects. To see this, observe that a reduction in p g reduces r for a given value of . All else equal, this shifts demand towards the generic drug. If is endogenized by the generic market share, this will then lead to a further reduction in r, reinforcing the generic …rm's incentive to reduce prices as a response to RP.
When assessing the e¤ect of RP on generic competition, we have, by considering marginal changes in , implicitly compared the outcome with the free pricing equilibrium, since this equilibrium coincides with the RP equilibrium in the limit ! 0. However, notice that, since a binding price cap reduces generic competition (compared with free pricing), the positive e¤ect of RP on generic market shares would be even larger if we compared with a price cap equilibrium. The drug pricing responses of replacing price cap regulation with RP are less clear, and depends on the strictness of price cap regulation.
If the price cap is su¢ ciently low, we cannot rule out the possibility that replacing this regulatory system with RP will increase drug prices. However, the fact that we observe generic competition in markets with price cap regulation suggests that, in reality, the price cap is generally set well above marginal production costs. Furthermore, the descriptive data from the policy experiment we exploit in the subsequent empirical analysis does not suggest that this is a relevant case.
In our theoretical model, we have also made the simplifying assumption that there is only one generic competitor to the brand-name drug. How is the presence of more than one generic competitor likely to a¤ect the results derived from the basic model? If generic drugs are perfect substitutes in demand, it only takes two generic drug producers to induce marginal cost pricing for generics. Since drug prices are strategic complements (cf. (8) and (9)), it is straightforward to show that this would reduce the equilibrium price of the brand-name drug in our model. Thus, more generic competitors should intuitively lead to lower drug prices. Of course, marginal cost pricing of generics with two or more generic competitors is a somewhat extreme case. In reality, there are likely to be demand frictions that will lead to drug prices in excess of marginal production costs also for generics, even if a higher number of generic competitors has a dampening e¤ect on drug prices. 18 In any case, as our theoretical model demonstrates, the e¤ects of RP on drug prices and market shares go mainly through the change in relative copayment rates between brand-name and generics and should therefore not depend qualitatively on the number of generics.
Based on the above theoretical analysis and discussion, we postulate the following hypotheses for the empirical analysis: Switching from price cap regulation to reference pricing leads to (i) a reduction in brand-name and generic prices (given that price cap regulation is not excessively strict),
(ii) an increase (decrease) in generic (brand-name) market shares, and, consequently, (iii) a reduction in average molecule prices.
Obviously, the last prediction follows as a result of the …rst two predictions.
Institutional background
The Norwegian pharmaceutical market is, as most other Western pharmaceutical markets, extensively regulated. The regulatory body is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care
Services and its agency called the Norwegian Medicines Agency. Norway has adopted the European patent law system to a large extent, implying that all new chemical entities are subject to patent protection for a given period. To launch their products on the Norwegian market, pharmaceutical …rms need a government approval. The approval is based on (clinical) evidence showing that the drug is not dangerous and has a positive health e¤ect. To get the drug listed for reimbursement ("blue list"), the pharmaceutical …rms must in addition provide evidence of a positive cost-bene…t analysis.
All prescription drugs (reimbursable or not) are subject to price control. The current system introduced in 2000 is a price cap scheme based on international reference pricing, also called external referencing. This system covers all prescription drugs, both on-patent and o¤-patent, except for those included in the reference price system. Under price cap regulation, producers have to report foreign prices in a de…ned set of "comparable" countries. 19 The price cap, which is the maximum domestic price a producer can charge for its product, is then set equal to the average of the three lowest reported foreign prices of this drug. Generic versions get the same price cap as the brand-names, but the price cap rarely binds as they are typically priced lower than the brand-name. The price cap is imposed at the wholesale level. The government then de…nes the maximum mark-up the pharmacies can charge, which in turn determines the price cap at the retail level for each product.
The reference price system, called "index pricing", was introduced in March 2003 for a subsample of o¤-patent pharmaceuticals facing generic competition. Initially, the index price system covered six chemical substances: Citalopram (depression), Omeprazol (antiulcer), Cetirizin (allergy), Loratadin (allergy), Enalapril (high blood pressure) and Lisinopril (high blood pressure). The system was later extended with two additional substances; Simvastatin (high cholesterol) and Amlodipin (high blood pressure). The choice of drugs were based on two criteria: …rst, they should cover a wide set of diseases and not be concentrated within one particular disease type; second, the selected drugs should be high-volume drugs. 20 The government decided to terminate the system by the end of 2004, arguing that the price reductions and cost savings were lower than expected. 21 Thus, in total the system ran for almost two years. 22 In calculating the index (reference) price, the government …rst clustered together drugs with the same chemical substance. Within each substance group, drugs were classi…ed into subgroups depending on package size and dosage in order to adjust for cost variation. The index price system provided strong incentives for generic substitution at pharmacy level. The pharmacies obtained the positive margin of selling a (generic) drug priced lower than the reference price. However, they also faced the negative margin of selling a (brand-name) drug priced higher than the reference price. Thus, we expect that the pharmacies always would suggest a generic substitute to patients, except for the case when the physician has made a reservation against generic substitution on the prescription. 24 Patients are in Norway required to pay coinsurance for all reimbursable prescription 2 0 The …rst criterion is helpful for identi…cation purposes since it provides us with a proper control group. The second criterion could potentially be a problem if the selected drugs di¤er from the non-selected drugs. In Section 6, we therefore perform a pre-reform test, showing no signi…cant di¤erences in prices and market shares for the treatment (reference priced drugs) and the control (price capped drugs) group. 2 1 The decision was based on an evaluation report, using data until February 2004. As will be shown below, our analysis strongly indicates that the evaluation was carried out too early. Price and market share e¤ects became substantial after some time, especially during 2004. 2 2 The new system is also a reference price system. However, the pricing rule is di¤erent and is calculated as a discount on patent-period brand-name prices. 2 3 The initial reference price was based on drug prices that were set before the introduction of the RP system was announced. Thus, it was in principle not possible for the drug producers to game the regulator by increasing prices in the period before RP was introduced (see Miraldo, 2009 ). 2 4 The RP reform in Norway did not include incentives on the physician-side. Physicians were as usual encouraged to prescribe cheaper generics when possible, but there were no …nancial incentives like in, for instance, Germany (physician budgets).
drugs. The coinsurance rate is 36 percent of the price of the drug. However, for the drugs included in the reference price system, patients had, in addition, to pay the full price di¤erence between the reference price and the high-priced brand-name, if they refused generic substitution. There are patient expenditure caps, which for the period of our study were 400 NOK per script and 1,350 NOK per year. However, these caps did not apply to the extra copayment under reference pricing if the patient refused generic substitution.
Thus, consumers had to fully cover the price di¤erence between the brand-name and the reference price even if they were already at the expenditure cap level.
Data and descriptive statistics
In the empirical analysis we use data from Farmastat. 25 Their database includes information on sales value and volume for each package of drugs sold at the Norwegian pharmaceutical market. Values are in pharmacy purchase prices and volumes in de…ned daily doses (DDD) for the active substance according to the ATC-code system. 26 The database also provides detailed information about product name, manufacturer, launch date, package size, dosage, etc. Our empirical strategy relies on a comparison of drugs subject to reference pricing with drugs under price cap regulation. Since most of the drugs in the index price system faced generic competition for a relatively short period before they came subject to the reform, we only include molecules with generic entry after 1st of January 1998 in our sample. This leaves us with 24 ATC groups. Table 1 lists the main characteristics of these molecules: 2 5 Farmastat is a company specialised in provision of pharmaceutical statistics. The company is owned by the Norwegian Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. 2 6 The ATC-code system is used by the World Health Organization to classify pharmaceutical substances according to their chemical, pharmacological and therapeutic properties. Pharmaceuticals sharing the same seven-digit (…ve-level) ATC-code have the same ingredients and are considered equivalent in the treatment of a given disease.
[ Table 1 about here ]
The table …rst provides information about our dependent variables, i.e., average prices of brand-names and generics, brand-name market shares, and average molecule prices.
The average brand-name and generic prices are in DDD. Brand-name market share is the proportion of sales of brand-names compared to sales of generics within each ATC group.
Average molecule prices are calculated by weighting brand-name and generic prices with their market shares within each ATC group. All prices are de ‡ated using the consumer price index.
The table also provides information about our main explanatory variables. First, we list the average number of generic competitors within each of the 24 substances. From our theoretical discussion, we expect this to have a negative impact on brand-name and generic prices, as well as on brand-name market shares. Second, we have a variable capturing the degree of therapeutic competition, which is measured by the number of ATC groups having the same three …rst digits in their ATC code. We expect that more therapeutic competitors also contributes to lower brand-name and/or generic prices. This is in line with Ellison In explaining market shares, we also control for relative brand-name and generic prices.
This enables us to decompose the direct demand e¤ect of reference pricing due to the changes in copayment structure from the indirect demand e¤ect due to price responses by the …rms.The "Relative price" variable is calculated as brand-name prices divided by the quantity weighted average of generic drug prices for each substance. In the analysis we divide time into one month periods. Substances that face generic competition over the total sample period are therefore represented with 48 observations in the dataset. Finally, there is a column indicating whether or not the substance is exposed to reference pricing. 27 The main objective of the empirical analysis is to test the hypotheses derived in Section 2. Our …rst hypothesis postulates that (given that the price cap is not excessively strict) a switch from PC regulation to (endogenous) RP leads to a price reduction for both brandnames and generics. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 support our …rst hypothesis.
Prices of brand-names subject to reference pricing are reduced by almost 23 percent after the reform, while the reduction is only 8.5 percent for the brand-names under price cap regulation over the same period. Moreover, generics subject to the reform face a price reduction of almost 13 percent, while there is no price change for generics under price cap regulation for the whole period.
[ Table 2 about here ]
Our second hypothesis postulates that a switch from price cap regulation to reference pricing should reduce (increase) brand-name (generic) market shares. In Table 2 we compare (average) brand-name market shares before and after the reference pricing reform with (average) market shares for brand-names under price cap regulation over the same period. From the table we see that while there has been a decrease in brand-name market shares for both groups, the decrease is substantially larger for the drugs subject to reference pricing. Finally, our third hypothesis says that, as a consequence, the average prices at molecule level should be reduced. We see that average molecule prices fall for all drugs, but the e¤ect seems to be stronger for drugs subject to RP.
Empirical method and results
In this section we analyze the impact of reference pricing on average brand-name and we are able to compare inter-temporal variation in outcomes before and after the imposition of the reform. Therefore, identi…cation relies not only on before-after comparison, but also on comparison of variations in outcomes for molecules subject to reference pricing with variation in outcomes for molecules not subject to this reform.
In the analyses, we estimate di¤erent versions of the following …xed e¤ect model:
where Y it is one of the three outcomes described above for molecule i at time t, a i is a molecule …xed e¤ect, t is a period speci…c e¤ect common to all molecules, " it represents unobserved time varying factors that a¤ect outcomes, X 0 it contains observable variables (the number generics and the number of therapeutic competitors), and D it is a variable indicating whether or not molecule i is subject to reference pricing at time t. The e¤ect of introducing reference pricing is captured by and the e¤ect of the control variables is measured by the vector .
Brand-name and generic prices
We start out with presenting the basic results from the regression models speci…ed in (25) .
First, we analyze the e¤ect of reference pricing on average brand-name and generic prices by estimating the following …xed e¤ect model:
where ln P it is the natural logarithm of average brand-name and generic prices. 28 By including an interaction term (D it B i ) between the reference price indicator (D it ) and the brand-name indicator (B i ), we can separate the e¤ect of reference pricing on brandnames from the price e¤ect on generics. The results from the regression are reported in Model 1 in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 about here ]
We …nd that reference pricing leads to a signi…cant reduction in both brand-name and generic average prices, with the e¤ect being stronger for brand-names (33 percent) than for generics (22 percent). Thus, the claim by Danzon and Liu (1996) and Danzon and Ketcham (2004) that reference pricing results in higher generic prices is not supported.
The …nding is, however, in line with our theoretical prediction (Hypothesis 1), as well as previous empirical …ndings by Pavcnik (2002) and .
From Model 1 we also see that the number of generic competitors has a positive e¤ect on average prices. This result is counterintuitive and in contrast to our theoretical prediction.
However, the positive e¤ect is most likely due to endogeneity problems; i.e., high prices might attract more generics. Notice that all drugs in our sample has by de…nition at least one generic competitor, which means that we measure the e¤ect on prices of the intensity, not the existence, of generic competition. 29 We return to the endogeneity issue in Section 6.
Generic competition
The e¤ect of reference pricing on generic competition is not a priori evident, as pointed out in Section 2. Reference pricing changes the copayment structure, making the brand-name drug relatively more expensive than the generics, which increases the generics' market share (for given prices). However, the brand-names respond to reference pricing by lowering their prices in order to retain their market shares. The net e¤ect on market shares is thus determined by the relative strength of these two counteracting e¤ects.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the brand-names'market shares (as a percentage). This measure of generic competition has been used in previous work, for instance, Aronsson et al. (2001) . In the regressions we control for molecule and period speci…c e¤ects, as well as the number of generic and therapeutic competitors, and relative prices.
The results are presented in Model 2 in Table 3 above.
We …nd that the imposition of reference pricing leads to a signi…cant (14:7 percent) reduction in brand-name market shares. Since we control for relative prices in the regression, we can interpret this decrease as a direct demand response to reference pricing and the corresponding change in the copayment structure. Relative prices are, however, likely to be endogenous. While relative branded-generic prices might explain market shares, market shares might also in ‡uence …rms'price setting and thus relative prices. We return to this issue in Section 6.
We also …nd a negative e¤ect of the number of generics on the brand-name market shares, which is in line with our theoretical prediction. The number of therapeutic competitors have a positive e¤ect on brand-name market shares. Stronger therapeutic competition might lead to a price reduction for brand-name drugs, which in turn increases their market share.
Average molecule prices
We now quantify the e¤ect of reference pricing on average molecule prices. Qualitatively, the impact on average molecule prices is evident, since we have found that RP leads to lower brand-name and generic prices, as well as lower brand-name market shares. However, for policy implications it is of interest to quantify the e¤ect.
The dependent variable in the regression is the logarithm of the average price at molecule level, where we use the market shares of brand-names and generics as weights. We control for molecule and time period speci…c e¤ects, as well as the number of generic and therapeutic competitors. The results are reported in Model 3 in Table 3 .
We see that RP lowers average molecule prices by almost 30 percent. This is a substantial price reduction, especially taking into account that Norway has a relatively strict price cap regime, as explained in Section 3. Since total demand for prescription drugs is relatively price inelastic, a 30 percent reduction in average molecule prices indicates substantial cost savings from introducing RP in the pharmaceutical o¤-patent market. It follows from the above analysis that these cost savings are explained partly by drug price reductions and partly by an increase in generic market shares.
Robustness checks
To check the robustness of our …ndings in the previous section, we conduct a number of tests. First, we check the validity of our comparison group (consisting of o¤-patent drugs subject to price cap regulation throughout the whole period). Second, we account for potential serial correlation in the errors. Finally, we address the possibility that endogeneity might bias our results.
Pre-reform tests
An important assumption in the analyses in Section 5 is that the error term " it is uncorrelated with the reform dummy variable D it (as well as with X 0 it and t ). This implies that, after controlling for covariates and molecule speci…c e¤ects in the pre-reform period, the trends in the dependent variables for drugs subject to reference pricing should not di¤er from trends for drugs subject to price cap regulation. A test of this assumption is presented in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here ]
Here we only use observations prior to the RP reform. In order to compare the prereform trends in prices and market shares for drugs in the treatment and control group, we include interactions between the period dummies and a variable indicating treated molecules (in the post-reform period). If the interactions are insigni…cant, this is an indication of a legitimate control group, i.e., that unobservable factors a¤ecting prices and market shares are uncorrelated with the probability that a given molecule is in the treatment group. As evident from Table 4 , all interactions are statistically insigni…cant in all three models. In addition, F-tests suggest that the interactions are jointly insigni…cant.
These results indicate that average brand-name and generic prices, brand-name market shares and average molecule prices for drugs in the two di¤erent groups are following the same general trend before the RP reform was implemented. We therefore conclude that the comparison group is legitimate. when the number of observations is small. In Table 5 we give the results on our three di¤erent outcomes when we ignore the time series information:
Accounting for serial correlation
[ Table 5 about here ]
Despite the substantial reduction in the number of observations 30 , we …nd signi…cant e¤ects on average brand-name and generic prices (Model 1), brand-name market shares (Model 2) and average molecule prices (Model 3). As expected, the standard errors are larger than those reported in Table 3 , while the estimated e¤ects of RP are about the same magnitude. We also see from Model 1 that brand-names do not have a signi…cantly stronger price reduction than generics. However, the results also suggest that the strong signi…cant e¤ects of RP on average brand-name and generic prices, brand-name market shares and average molecule prices are not driven by biased standard errors.
Accounting for endogeneity
In our basic regression models in Section 5 the number of generics and relative prices are likely to be endogenous. For instance, high prices might attract more generics, while more generics might result in lower prices. This endogeneity problem can be the explanation for the positive e¤ect of the number of generics on average prices.
In this section we allow for endogenous explanatory variables by a GMM-IV estimator 31 that is robust to, and e¢ cient in the presence of, arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (see Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman, 2007) . The long-run heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix is generated using the Bartlett kernel function with a bandwidth of 12. 32 Orthogonality of the instruments is tested by Hansen's J statistic, which is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (the null hypothesis is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term). However, instrument exogeneity is only one of the two criteria necessary for instruments to be As instruments we use …rst to third lag of the endogenous variables. In addition we also use …rst to third lag of number of generics in Sweden as instruments. It is reasonable to assume that the number generics in Sweden are correlated with the number of generics in Norway, but not directly correlated with average prices and brand name market shares.
The results from the GMM-IV models are reported in Table 6 . 33 We …rst notice that the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term) for all three models, suggesting that the set of instruments is appropriate. Considering the underidenti…cation test, the null (i.e., the equation is underidenti…ed) is rejected for all models, which implies that the models are identi…ed. The weak identi…cation tests suggest that the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variables is su¢ cient strong for model 1 and 2. However, for our third model (average molecule prices), we see that the F -statistic is below 10, indicating that there might be a weak instrument problem.
Focusing …rst on the e¤ect of reference pricing, the results from the GMM-IV estimators are consistent with the results in Section 6.2. We …nd that RP signi…cantly reduces brand-name and generic prices, brand-name market shares and average molecule prices.
Moreover, we also see that RP does not have a signi…cantly stronger impact on brand-name prices than generic prices (Model 1).
From Table 6 we further see that the number of generics now has a negative, but insigni…cant e¤ect on average prices (Model 1 and 3) . Thus, the counterintuitive e¤ect obtained in the static model is no longer present when we control for endogeneity. We also …nd that the number of generics has an insigni…cant, but negative, e¤ect on brand-name market shares. The e¤ects of the number of therapeutic competitors and relative prices are consistent with the results reported in Section 5.
Concluding Remarks
From a simple theoretical model of branded-generic competition we have shown that endogenous RP reduces brand-name and generic drug prices, increases generic market shares and, consequently, reduces average molecule prices (and thus total expenditure on pharma- By way of conclusion, we would like to identify some aspects of pharmaceutical markets that should be taken into account when assessing our results and their implications. Finally, we should stress that e¤ects of regulatory regimes, like PC regulation and RP, on innovation incentives and health outcomes are two very important issues that deserve to be examined much more carefully. 34 To obtain long-run welfare implications of regulatory regimes, it is not su¢ cient only to consider the price and demand (market share) e¤ects, but also analyze the impact of the regimes on entry (and exit) of (branded and generic)
drugs. 35 In the current paper, we ignore e¤ects on drug launching and R&D, implying that we cannot make a strong recommendation about the desirability of reference pricing versus price cap regulation in a broader sense. These issues are clearly beyond the scope of the present study, so we leave them for future research.
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